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Abstract. Stackelberg Games are gaining importance in the last years
due to the raise of Adversarial Machine Learning (AML). Within this
context, a new paradigm must be faced: in classical game theory, inter-
vening agents were humans whose decisions are generally discrete and
low dimensional. In AML, decisions are made by algorithms and are
usually continuous and high dimensional, e.g. choosing the weights of a
neural network. As closed form solutions for Stackelberg games gener-
ally do not exist, it is mandatory to have efficient algorithms to search
for numerical solutions. We study two different procedures for solving
this type of games using gradient methods. We study time and space
scalability of both approaches and discuss in which situation it is more
appropriate to use each of them. Finally, we illustrate their use in an
adversarial prediction problem.
Keywords: Game Theory · Adversarial Machine Learning · Adjoint
Method · Automatic Differentiation.
1 Introduction
Over the last decade, the introduction of machine learning applications in nu-
merous fields has grown tremendously. In particular, applications in security
settings have grown substantially, [20]. In this domain, it is frequently the case
that the data distribution at application time is different of the training data
distribution, thus violating one of the key assumptions in machine learning. This
difference between training and test distributions generally comes from the pres-
ence of adaptive adversaries who deliberately manipulate data to avoid being
detected.
The field of Adversarial Machine Learning (AML) studies, among other
things, how to guarantee the security of machine learning algorithms against
adversarial perturbations [2]. A possible approach consists of modelling the in-
teraction between the learning algorithm and the adversary as a game in which
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one agent controls the predictive model parameters while the other manipulates
input data. Several different game theoretic models of this problem have been
proposed, as reviewed in [28]. In particular, [5] view adversarial learning as a
Stackelberg game in which, a leader (she), the defender in the security jargon,
makes her decision about choosing the parameters in a learning model, and,
then, the follower or attacker (he), after having observed the leader’s decision,
chooses an optimal data transformation.
Mathematically, finding Nash equilibria of such Stackelberg games requires
solving a bilevel optimization problem, which, in general cannot be undertaken
analytically, [26], and numerical approaches are required. However, standard
techniques are not able to deal with continuous and high dimensional decision
spaces, as those appearing in AML applications.
In this paper, we propose two procedures to solve Stackelberg games in the
new paradigm of AML and study their time and space scalability. In particular,
one of the proposed solutions scales efficiently in time with the dimension of the
decision space, at the cost of more memory requirements. The other scales well in
space, but requires more time. The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we
define Stackelberg games. Section 3 presents the proposed solution methods as
well as a discussion of the scalability of both approaches. The proposed solutions
are illustrated with an AML experiment in Section 4. Finally, we conclude and
present some lines for future research.
2 Stackelberg games
We consider a class of sequential games between two agents: the first one makes
her decision, and then, after having observed the decision, the second one imple-
ments his response. These games have received various names in the literature
including sequential Defend-Attack [4] or Stackelberg [10, 27] games. As an ex-
ample, consider adversarial prediction problems, [5]. In them, the first agent
chooses the parameters of a certain predictive model; the second agent, after
having observed such parameters, chooses an optimal data transformation to
fool the first agent as much as possible, so as to obtain some benefit.
As we focus on applications of Stackelberg games to AML, we restrict our-
selves to the case in which the Defender (D) chooses her defense α ∈ Rn and,
then, the Attacker (A) chooses his attack β ∈ Rm, after having observed α. The
corresponding bi-agent influence diagram, [11], is shown in Fig. 1. The dashed
arc between nodes D and A reflects that the Defender choice is observed by the
Attacker. The utility function of the Defender, uD(α, β), depends on both, her
decision, and the attacker’s decision. Similarly, the Attacker’s utility function has
the form uA(α, β). In this type of games, it is assumed that the Defender knows
uA(α, β). This assumption is known as the common knowledge hypothesis.
Mathematically, finding Nash equilibrium of Stackelberg games requires solv-
ing a bilevel optimization problem, [1]. The defender’s utility is called upper level
or outer objective function while the attacker’s one is referred to as lower level
or inner objective function. Similarly, the upper and lower level optimization
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Fig. 1: The two-player sequential decision game with certain outcome.
problems, correspond to the defender’s and the attacker’s problem, respectively.
These problems are also referred to as outer and inner problems.
It is generally assumed that the attacker will act rationally in the sense that
he will choose an action that maximizes his utility, [8], given the disclosed de-
fender’s decision α. Assuming that there is a unique global maximum of the
attacker’s utility for each α, and calling it β∗(α), a Stackelberg equilibrium is
identified using backward induction: the defender has to choose α∗ that maxi-
mizes her utility subject to the attacker’s response β∗(α). Mathematically, the
problem to be solved by the defender is
argmax
α
uD[α, β
∗(α)]
s.t. β∗(α) = argmax
β
uA(α, β).
(1)
The pair (α∗, β∗(α∗)) is a Nash equilibrium and a sub-game perfect equilibrium
[14].
When the attacker problem has more than one global maximum, several types
of equilibrium have been proposed. The two more important are the optimistic
and the pessimistic solutions, [26]. In an optimistic position, the defender expects
the attacker to choose the optimal solution which gives the higher upper level
utility. On the other hand, the pessimistic approach suggests that the defender
should optimize for the worst case attacker solution. In this paper, we just deal
with the case in which the inner utility has a unique global maximum.
3 Solution Method
Bilevel optimization problems can rarely be solved analytically. Indeed even ex-
tremely simple instances of bilevel problems have been shown to be NP-hard,
[16]. Thus, numerical techniques are required. Several classical and evolutionary
approaches have been proposed to solve (1), as reviewed by [26]. When the in-
ner problem adheres to certain regularity conditions, it is possible to reduce the
bilevel optimization problem to a single level one replacing the inner problem
with its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. Then, evolutionary techniques
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could be used to solve this single-level problem, thus making possible to relax
the upper level requirements. As, in general, this single-level reduction is not fea-
sible, several other approaches have been proposed, such as nested evolutionary
algorithms or metamodeling-based methods. However, most of these approaches
lack scalability: increasing the number of upper level variables produces an ex-
ponential increase on the number of lower level tasks required to be solved being
thus impossible to apply these techniques to solve large scale bilevel problems
as the ones appearing in the context of AML.
In [5] the authors face the problem of solving Stackelberg games in the AML
context. However, they focus on a very particular type of game which can be
reformulated as a quadratic program. In this paper, we provide more general
procedures to solve Stackelberg games that are useful in the AML paradigm in
which decision spaces are continuous and high dimensional. To this end, we focus
on gradient ascent techniques to solve bilevel optimization problems.
Let us assume that for any α the solution of the inner problem is unique. This
solution defines an implicit function β∗(α). Thus, problem (1) may be viewed
solely in terms of the defender decisions α. The underlying idea behind gradient
ascent techniques is the following: given a defender decision α ∈ Rn a direction
along which the defender’s utility increases while maintaining feasibility must be
found, and then, we move α in that direction. Thus, the major issue of ascent
methods is to find the gradient of uD(α, β
∗(α)). In [18] the authors provide
a method to approximate such gradient that work for relatively large classical
optimization problems but it is clearly insufficient to deal with the typical bilevel
problems appearing in AML.
Recently, [7] proposed forward and reverse-based methods for computing the
gradient of the validation error in certain hyperparamenter optimization prob-
lems that appear in Deep Learning. Structurally, hyperparameter optimization
problems are similar to Stackelberg games. We adapt their methodology to this
domain. In particular we propose two alternative approaches to compute the
gradient of uD[α, β
∗(α)] with different memory and running time requirements.
We refer to these approaches as backward and forward solutions, respectively.
Notation For the sake of clarity, we use the following notation: the gradient
will be denoted as dx; the partial derivative as ∂x. Similarly, second partial
derivatives will be denoted as ∂2x and ∂x∂y. We shall use this notation indistinctly
for the unidimensional and multidimensional cases. For instance, if f(x, y) is a
scalar function, x is a p-dimensional vector and y is a q-dimensional vector, then
∂2xf(x, y) is the p× p matrix whose (i, j) entry is ∂xi∂xjf(x, y), where xi is the
i-th component of the vector x. Similarly, ∂x∂yf(x, y) is a p × q matrix whose
i, j entry is ∂xi∂yjf(x, y).
3.1 Backward solution
We propose here a new gradient ascent approach to solve the bilevel problem
(1) whose running time scales well with the defender’s decision space dimension.
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In particular, we propose to approximate problem (1) by the following PDE-
constrained optimization problem, [15]
argmax
α
uD [α, β(α, T )]
s.t. ∂tβ(α, t) = ∂βuA[α, β(α, t)]
β(α, 0) = 0.
(2)
The idea is formalized in the next proposition, that can be proved using the
results in [3].
Proposition 1. Suppose that the following assumptions hold
1. The attacker problem, the inner problem in (1), has a unique solution β∗(α)
for each defender decision α.
2. For all ǫ > 0 and all α,
inf
‖β∗(α)−β‖2
2
>ǫ
〈β − β∗(α), ∂βuA[α, β]〉 > 0.
If β(α, t) satisfies the differential equation
∂tβ(α, t) = ∂βuA[α, β(α, t)] (3)
then β(α, t)→ β∗(α) as t→∞, with rate O
(
1
t
)
.
The idea in (2) is thus to constrain the trajectories β(α, t) to satisfy (3) and
approximate the defender’s problem using β(α, T ) with T ≫ 1, instead of β∗(α).
We propose solving problem (2) using gradient ascent and the adjoint method,
[24], to compute the total derivative of the defender utility function with respect
to her decision. The adjoint method defines an adjoint function λ(t) satisfying
the adjoint equation
dtλ(t) = −λ(t) ∂
2
βuA[α, β(α, t)]. (4)
In terms of the adjoint function, the derivative of the defender utility with respect
to her decision would be written as
dαuD[α, β(α, T )] = ∂αuD[α, β(α, T )]−
∫ T
0
λ(t)∂α∂βuA[α, β(α, t)] dt. (5)
In Appendix A, we prove that if λ(t) satisfies the adjoint equation (4), the
derivative of the defender utility can be written as in (5).
Algorithmically, we can proceed by discretizing (4) via Euler method, and
approximate the derivative (5) discretizing the integral on the left hand side.
This leads to Algorithm 1. Once we are able to compute this derivative, we can
solve the defender’s problem using gradient ascent.
Regarding its complexity, note that by basic facts of Automatic Differentia-
tion (AD), [12], if τ(n,m) is the time required to evaluate uD(α, β) and uA(α, β),
then computing derivatives of these functions requires time O(τ(n,m)). Thus the
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Algorithm 1 Approximate total derivative of defender utility function with
respect to her decision using the backward solution
1: procedure Approximate Derivative using Backward Method(α, T )
2: β0(α) = 0
3: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
4: βt(α) = βt−1(α) + η∂βuA(α, β)
∣∣∣
βt−1
5: end for
6: λT = −∂βuD(α, β)
∣∣∣
βT
7: dαuD = ∂αuD[α, βT (α)]
8: for t = T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 0 do
9: dαuD = dαuD − ηλt+1∂α∂βuA(α, β)
∣∣∣
βt+1
10: λt = λt+1
[
I + η∂2βuA(α, β)
∣∣∣
βt+1
]
11: end for
12: return dαuD
13: end procedure
first for loop in Algorithm 1 requires time O(Tτ(n,m)). In the second loop, we
need to compute second derivatives, which appear always multiplying the vec-
tor λt. By basic results of AD, Hessian vector products have the same time
complexity as function evaluations. Thus in our case, we can compute second
derivatives in time O(τ(n,m)) being the time complexity of the second for loop
O(Tτ(n,m)). Thus, overall, Algorithm 1 runs in time O(Tτ(n,m)). Regarding
space complexity, as it is necessary to store the values of βt(α) produced in the
first loop for later usage in the second one, if σ(n,m) is the space requirement for
storing each βt(α), then O(Tσ(n,m)) is the space complexity of the backward
algorithm.
In certain applications where space complexity is critical, the backward so-
lution could be infeasible as, within each iteration, it requires storing the whole
trace βt(α). In this particular cases, the forward solution proposed in the next
section, solves this issue at a cost of loosing time scalability.
3.2 Forward solution
In this case, we approximate (1) by
argmax
α
uD [α, βT (α)]
s.t βt(α) = βt−1(α) + ηt∂βuA(α, β)
∣∣∣
βt−1
t = 1, . . . , T
β0(α) = 0.
(6)
The idea here is that, for each defense α, we condition on a dynamical system that
under certain conditions converges to β∗(α), the optimal solution for the attacker
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when the defender plays α. Thus, we can approximate the defender’s utility by
uD [α, βT (α)], with T ≫ 1. This idea is formalized in the next proposition that
can be proved using the results of [3].
Proposition 2. Suppose that the following assumptions hold
1. The attacker problem (the inner problem in (1)) has a unique solution β∗(α)
for each defender decision α.
2. For all ǫ > 0 and α
inf
‖β−β∗(α)‖2
2
>ǫ
〈β − β∗(α), ∂βuA[α, β]〉 > 0
3. For some A,B > 0 and all α
‖∂βuA[α, β]‖
2
2 ≤ A+B‖β − β
∗(α)‖22
If for all t, βt(α) satisfies
βt(α) = βt−1(α) + η∂βuA(α, β)
∣∣∣
βt−1
(7)
Then, βt(α) converges to β
∗(α), with rate O
(
1
t
)
.
We propose solving problem (6) using gradient ascent. To that end, we need
to compute dαuD(α, βT (α)). Using the chain rule we have
dαuD[α, βT (α)] = ∂αuD[α, βT (α)] + ∂βT uD[α, βT (α)] dαβT (α)
To obtain dαβT (α), we can sequentially compute dαβt(α) taking derivatives in
(7)
dαβt(α) = dαβt−1(α) + ηt−1
[
∂α∂βuA(α, β)
∣∣∣
βt−1
+ ∂2βuA(α, β)
∣∣∣
βt−1
dαβt−1(α)
]
This induces a dynamical system in dαβt(α) that can be iterated in parallel to
the dynamical system in βt(α). The whole procedure is described in Algorithm 2.
Once we are able to compute this derivative, we can solve the defender’s problem
using gradient ascent.
Regarding time complexity, note that the bottleneck in Algorithm 2 is that
we need to compute second derivatives of uA(α, β). In particular, computing
∂2βuA(α, β) requires time O(mτ(m,n)) as it requires computing m Hessian vec-
tor products, one with each of the m the unitary vectors. On the other hand,
computing ∂α∂βuA(α, β) requires computing n Hessian vector products and thus
time O(nτ(m,n)), while if we compute the derivative in the other way, first
we derive with respect to β and then with respect to α, the time complex-
ity is O(mτ(m,n)). Thus, we derive first with respect to the variable with the
biggest dimension. Then, the time complexity of computing ∂α∂βuA(α, β) is
O(min(n,m)τ(m,n)). Finally, as ∂2βuA(α, β) and ∂α∂βuA(α, β) could be com-
puted in parallel, then the overall time complexity of the forward solution is
O(max[min(n,m),m]Tτ(m,n)) = O(mTτ(m,n)). Regarding space, as in this
case the values βt(α) are overwritten at each iteration, we do not need to store
all of them and the overall space complexity is O(σ(m,n)).
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Algorithm 2 Approximate total derivative of defender utility function with
respect to her decision using the forward solution.
1: procedure Approximate Derivative using Forward Method(α, T )
2: β0(α) = 0
3: dαβ0(α) = 0
4: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
5: βt(α) = βt−1(α) + η∂βuA(α, β)
∣∣∣
βt−1
6: dαβt(α) = dαβt−1(α)+ηt−1
[
∂α∂βuA(α, β)
∣∣∣
βt−1
+ ∂2βuA(α, β)
∣∣∣
βt−1
dαβt−1(α)
]
7: end for
8: dαuD = ∂αuD[α, βT (α)] + ∂βT uD[α, βT (α)] dαβT (α)
9: return dαuD
10: end procedure
4 Experiments
We illustrate now the proposed approaches. We start with a conceptual exam-
ple in which we empirically test the scalability properties of both algorithms.
Then, we apply the algorithms to solve a problem in the context of adversarial
regression.
All the code used for these examples has been written in python using the py-
torch library for Automatic Differentiation, [23]; and is available at https://github.com/roinaveiro/GM_SG.
4.1 Conceptual Example
We use a simple example to illustrate the scalability of the proposed approaches.
Consider that the attacker’s and defender’s decisions are both vectors in Rn.
The attacker’s utility takes the form uA(α, β) = −
∑n
i=1 3(βi − αj)
2 and the
defender’s one is uD(α, β) = −
∑n
i=1(7αi+β
2
j ). In this case, the equilibrium can
be computed analytically using backward induction: for a given defense α ∈ Rn
we see that β∗(α) = α; substituting in the outer problem, the equilibrium is
reached at α∗j = −3.5, β
∗
j (α
∗) = −3.5 with j = 1, . . . ,m.
We apply the proposed methods to this problem to test their scalability
empirically. The parameters were chosen as follows: the learning rate η of Algo-
rithms 1 and 2 was set to 0.1; similarly, the learning rate of the gradient ascent
used to solve the outer problem was also set to 0.1. Finally, all gradient ascents
were run for T = 40, enough to reach convergence.
Figure 2 shows running times for increasing number of dimensions of the
decision spaces (in this problem both the attacker’s and the defender’s decision
space have the same dimension). As we discussed, the forward running time
increases linearly with the number of dimensions while the backward solution
remains approximately constant. This obviously comes at the cost of having
more memory requirements, as in Algorithm 1 we need to store the whole trace
βt(α). Thus, in problems where the dimension of β is very large the memory
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Fig. 2: Backward and Forward running times versus the dimension of decision
spaces.
cost of the backward solution would become prohibitive and we would need to
switch to the forward solution, as long as the dimension of α is small enough. In
contrast, if the dimension of α is very big, the forward solution would become
infeasible in time, thus being the backward optimal provided that the dimension
of β is such that it is possible to store the whole trace βt(α).
4.2 An application to adversarial regression
Problem statement We illustrate an application of the proposed methodology
to adversarial regression problems, [13]. They are a specific class of prediction
games, [5], played between a learner of a regression model and a data generator,
who tries to fool the learner modifying input data at application time, inducing
a change between the data distribution at training and test time, with the aim
of confusing the data generator and attain a benefit.
Given a feature vector x ∈ Rp and its corresponding target value y ∈ R,
the learner’s decision is to choose the weight vector w ∈ Rp of a linear model
fw(x) = x
⊤w, that minimizes the theoretical costs at application time, given by
θl(w, p¯, cl) =
∫
cl(x, y)(fw(x)− y)
2 dp¯(x, y),
where cl(x, y) ∈ R
+ reflects instance-specific costs and p¯(x, y) is the data distri-
bution at test time. To do so, the learner has a training matrix X ∈ Rn×p and
a vector of target values y ∈ Rn, that is a sample from distribution p(x, y) at
training time.
The data generator aims at changing features of test instances to induce a
transformation in the data distribution from p(x, y) to p¯(x, y). Let z(x, y) be
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the data generator’s target value for instance x with real value y, i.e. he aims
at transforming x to make the learner predict z(x, y) instead of y. The data
generator aims at choosing the transformation that minimizes the theoretical
costs given by
θd(w, p¯, cd) =
∫
cd(x, y)(fw(x)− z(x, y))
2 dp¯(x, y) +Ωd(p, p¯)
where Ωd(p, p¯) is the incurred cost when transforming p to p¯ and cd(x, y) are
instance specific costs.
As the theoretical costs defined above depend on the unknown distributions
p and p¯, we focus on their regularized empirical counterparts, given by
θ̂l(w, X¯, cl) =
n∑
i=1
cl,i(fw(x¯i)− yi)
2 +Ωl(fw),
θ̂d(w, X¯, cd) =
n∑
i=1
cd,i(fw(x¯i)− zi)
2 +Ωd(X, X¯).
In addition, we assume that the learner acts first, choosing a weight vector w.
Then the data generator, after observing w, chooses his optimal data transfor-
mation. Thus, the problem to be solved by the learner is
argmin
w
θ̂l(w, T (X,w, cd), cl)
s.t. T (X,w, cd) = argmin
X′
θ̂d(w,X
′, cd),
(8)
where T (X,w, cd) is the attacker’s optimal transformation for a given choice w
of weight vector. (8) has the same form as (1), except that it is formulated in
terms of costs rather than utilities. In addition, it is easy to see that if Ωd(X, X¯)
is equal to the squared Frobenius norm of the difference matrix ‖X− X¯‖2F , then
the attacker’s problem has a unique solution. Thus, we can use the proposed
solution techniques to look for Nash equilibria in this type of game, taking care
of performing gradient descent instead of gradient ascent, as we are minimizing
costs here.
Experimental results We apply the results to the UCI white wine dataset,
[6]. This contains real information about 4898 wines, that consists of 11 quality
indicators plus a wine quality score.
RJ and RD are two competing wine brands. RD has implemented a system to
automatically measure wine quality using a regression over the available quality
indicators: each wine is described by a vector of 11 entries, one per quality indi-
cator. Wine quality ranges between 0 and 10. RJ , aware of the actual superiority
of its competitor’s wines, decides to hack RD’s system by manipulating the value
of several quality indicators, to artificially decrease RD’s quality rates. However,
RD is aware of the possibility of being hacked, and decides to use adversarial
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methods to train its system. In particular, RD models the situation as a Stack-
elberg game. It is obvious that the target value of his enemy is z(x, y) = 0 for
every possible wine. In addition, RD was able to filter some information about
RJ ’s wine-specific costs cd,i.
As basic model, a regular ridge regression, [9], was trained using eleven prin-
cipal components as features. The regularization strength was chosen using re-
peated hold-out validation, [17], with ten repetitions. As performance metric we
used the root mean squared error (RMSE), estimated via repeated hold-out.
We compare the performance of two different learners against an adversary
whose wine specific costs cd,i are fixed: The first one, referred to as Nash, assumes
that the wine specific costs are common knowledge and plays Nash equilibria of
the Stackelberg game defined in (8). The second learner, refer to as raw, is a
non adversarial one and uses a ridge regression model. To this end, we split the
data in two parts, 2/3 for training purposes and the remaining 1/3 for test. The
training set is used to compute the weights w of the regression problem. Those
weights are observed by the adversary, and used to attack the test set. Then,
the RMSE is computed using this attacked test set and the previously computed
weights.
In order to solve (8), we use the backward solution solution method of Section
3.1 due to its better time scalability. The hyperparameters were chosen as follows:
number of epochs T to compute the gradient in Algorithm 1, 100; the learning
rate η in this same Algorithm, was set to 0.01. Within the gradient descent
optimization used to optimize the defender’s cost function, the number of epochs
was set to 350 and the learning rate to 10−6. Finally, we assumed that the wine
specific costs were the same for all instances and called the common value cd.
We studied how cd affects the RMSE for different solutions.
Notice that, in this case, the dimension of the attacker’s decision space is
huge. He has to modify the training data to minimize his costs. If there are k
instances in the training set, each of dimension n, the dimension of the attacker’s
decision space is n × k. In this case k = 3263 (2/3 of 4898) and n = 11. Thus
the forward solution is impractical in this case, and we did not compute it. We
show in Figure 3, the RMSE for different values of the wine specific cost. We
observe that Nash outperforms systematically the adversary unaware regression
method. In the limit cd → 0, we see that θ̂d(w, X¯, cd) → Ωd(X, X¯). Thus, in
this situation, the adversary will not manipulate the data. Consequently Nash
and ridge regression solutions will coincide, as shown in Figure 3. However, as cd
increases, data manipulation is bigger, and the RMSE of the adversary unaware
method also increases. On the other hand, the Nash solution RMSE remains
almost constant.
We have also computed the average and standard deviation of training times.
In an Intel Core i7-3630UM, 2.40GHz 8 computer, the average training time
is 131.6 seconds with 2.7 seconds standard deviation. This corresponds approx-
imately to 2.66 seconds per outer epoch. Each outer epoch involves running
Algorithm 1 with 100 inner epochs.
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Finally, to illustrate convergence of the proposed approach, we solve (8) using
gradient descent with the backward method for 20 different random initializa-
tions of the defender’s decisions ω. Results are depicted in Figure 4. As can be
seen, all paths converge with less than 150 epochs.
5 Discussion
The demand for scalable solutions of Stackelberg Games has increased in the last
years due to the use of such games to model confrontations within Adversarial
Machine Learning problems. In this paper, we have focused on gradient methods
for solving Stackelberg Games, providing two different approaches to compute
the gradient of the defender’s utility function: the forward and backward solu-
tions. In particular, we have shown that the backward solution scales well in
time with the defender’s decision space dimension, at a cost of more memory
requirements. On the other hand, the forward solution scales poorly in time with
this dimension, but well in space.
We have provided empirical support of the scalability properties of both ap-
proaches using a simple example. In addition, we have solved an AML problem
using the backward solution in a reasonable amount of time. In this problem,
the defender’s decision space is continuous with dimension 11. The attacker’s
decision space is also continuous with dimension O(104), as we showed in Sec-
tion 4.2. To the best of our knowledge, none of previous numerical techniques
for solving Stackelberg games could deal, in reasonable time, with such high
dimensional continuous decision spaces.
Apart from scalability properties, a major advantage of the proposed frame-
work is that it could be directly implemented in any Automatic Differentiation
library such as PyTorch (the one used in this example) or TensorFlow, and thus
benefit from the computational advantages of such implementations.
We could extend the framework in several ways. First, as we discussed, the
backward solution has poor space scalability. This is generally not an issue in
most applications. Nevertheless, if space complexity is critical it is possible to
reduce it at a cost of introducing a numerical error, as proposed in [19] in hyper-
parameter optimization problems. Instead of storing the whole trace βt(α) in the
first for loop of Algorithm 1 to use it in the second loop, we could sequentially
undo its gradient update at each step of the second for loop. Obviously, this
would introduce some numerical error.
Another possible line of work would be to extend the framework to deal with
Bayesian Stackelberg games, that are widely used to model situations in AML in
which there is not common knowledge of the adversary’s parameters. In this line,
the ultimate goal would be to apply the proposed algorithms to solve Adversarial
Risk Analyisis (ARA, [25]) problems in AML, [22].
Throughout the paper, we have focused on exact gradient methods. However,
it would be interesting to extend the proposed algorithms to work with stochastic
gradient methods. In addition, in [21] the authors propose several variants of
Gradient Ascent to solve saddle point problems. It could be worth investigating
how to extend such techniques to general Stackelberg Games.
Finally, we highlight that one of the most important contributions of the
paper is the derivation of the backward solution formulating the Stackelberg
game (1) as a PDE-constrained optimization problem and using the adjoint
method. This provides a general and scalable framework that could be used to
seek for Nash equilibria in other types of sequential games. Exploring this, is
another possible line of future work.
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A Proof of the adjoint method
The Lagrangian of problem (2) is
L = uD[α, β(α, T )] +
∫ T
0
λ(t) {dtβ(α, t)− ∂βuA[α, β(α, t)]} dt+ µβ(α, 0).
As the constraints hold, by construction we have that dαL = dαuD and
dαL = ∂αuD[α, β(α, T )] + ∂βuD[α, β(α, T )] dαβ(α, T ) + µ dαβ(α, 0)
+
∫ T
0
λ(t)
{
dt dαβ(α, t)− ∂α∂βuA[α, β(α, t)] − ∂
2
βuA[α, β(α, t)] dαβ(α, t)
}
dt.
(9)
Integrating by parts, we have∫ T
0
λ(t) dt dαβ(α, t) dt = [λ(t) dαβ(α, t)]
T
0 −
∫ T
0
dtλ(t) dαβ(α, t) dt
Inserting this in (9) and grouping the terms conveniently we have
dαL = ∂αuD[α, β(α, T )] +
{
∂βuD[α, β(α, T )] + λ(T )
}
dαβ(α, T ) + {µ− λ(0)} dαβ(α, 0)
+
∫ T
0
{
− dtλ(t) − λ(t)∂
2
βuA[α, β(α, t)]
}
dαβ(α, t) − λ(t)∂α∂βuA[α, β(α, t)] dt
Since the constraints hold, we may choose freely the Lagrange multipliers. In
particular, we may choose them so that we can avoid calculating the derivatives
of β(α, t) with respect to α (as this is computationally expensive). Thus, we have
that λ satisfies the adjoint equation
dtλ(t) = −λ(t)∂
2
βuA[α, β(α, t)]
with λ(T ) = −∂βuD[α, β(α, T )], and µ = λ(0). Using this, the derivative is
computed as
dαL = ∂αuD[α, β(α, T )]−
∫ T
0
λ(t)∂α∂βuA[α, β(α, t)] dt
